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The idea that suppressing an unwanted thought results in an ironic increase in its fre­
quency is accepted as psychological fact. Wegner’s ironic processes model has been ap­
plied to understanding the development and persistence of mood, anxiety, and other diffi­
culties. However, results are highly inconsistent and heavily influenced by experimental 
artifact. There are a substantial number of methodological considerations and issues that 
may underlie the inconsistent findings in the literature. These include the internal and ex­
ternal validity of the paradigms used to study thought suppression, conceptual issues 
such as what constitutes a thought, and consideration of participants’ history with and 
motivation to suppress the target thought. Paradigms that study the products of failed 
suppression, such as facilitated recall and attentional deployment to thought relevant 
stimuli may have greater validity. It is argued that a shift from conceptualizing the persis­
tence of unwanted thoughts as products of failed suppression and instead as internal 
threat stimuli may have merit.
Keywords: thought suppression, ironic processes, intrusive thoughts, rebound effect, thought rebound
Introduction
Think unsexy thoughts, think unsexy thoughts, think unsexy thoughts . . . D’OH!!!”
—Homer Simpson, The Simpsons
The term “thought suppression” is used in reference to any deliberate attempt to get rid 
of a thought. Interest in thought suppression accelerated in response to Wegner’s ironic 
processes model, which asserts that suppression is quite vulnerable to disruption under 
conditions of cognitive load and, when it fails, will produce in an ironic increase in 
thought occurrences. This model has been applied to understanding mood and anxiety 
difficulties characterized by the repeated recurrence of unwanted thoughts. However, 
many studies have failed to find an ironic effect of suppression on thought frequency and 
effect sizes have been small and vulnerable to experimental artifact. Furthermore, adap­
tive functioning relies on the capacity to inhibit thoughts that disrupt goal-directed be­
havior, even under conditions of cognitive load. This article describes Wegner’s ironic 
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processes model, reviews methodological and conceptual issues of importance to design­
ing studies and interpreting findings, revisits our accepted understanding of thought sup­
pression, and proposes new directions for future study.
Wegner’s Ironic Processes Model
In observing the difficulty individuals have in avoiding thoughts about a habit they are 
trying to break, Wegner and his colleagues proposed that suppression of unwanted 
thoughts is not only difficult and unsuccessful but that it will actually backfire, producing 
a resurgence of unwanted thoughts. In order to test these propositions, Wegner et al. 
(1987) randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions: (a) an “initial suppres­
sion” condition, in which participants were given strict instructions to suppress thoughts 
about a white bear for an initial five-minute period; or, (b) an “initial expression” group, 
in which participants were instructed to actively generate white bear thoughts during the 
initial period. In a second five-minute period the “initial suppression” participants were 
instructed to express, and the “initial expression” participants were instructed to sup­
press. Throughout the two periods, participants reported their stream of consciousness 
by speaking their thoughts aloud into a tape recorder. In addition, they recorded all oc­
currences of white bear thoughts by ringing a bell. Thus, the original thought suppression 
paradigm was a 2 (Order of instructions; suppress/express versus express/suppress) by 2 
(Interval; first versus second) Latin square design with number of thought occurrences 
serving as the dependent measure. Stream of consciousness reports were analyzed by 
two raters who counted the number of white bear (or “target”) thoughts in each interval.
Wegner et al. (1987) found that no participant was able to fully suppress white bear 
thoughts in the suppression condition, whether it occurred in the first or second period. 
Thought suppression, then, was observed to be both temporary and vulnerable to disrup­
tion. Wegner referred to unsuccessful suppression as an “immediate enhancement” effect 
of suppression efforts. Second, those who had first suppressed had more white bear 
thoughts during the expression interval than those who had first expressed. Wegner and 
his colleagues referred to this as the “rebound” effect of suppression. Furthermore, the 
number of thought occurrences during the expression period increased over time for the 
initial suppression group, whereas it decreased for those in the initial expression group, 
which was interpreted to mean that participants who suppressed developed an accelerat­
ing tendency to express, whereas initial thought expression lead to habituation.
Finally, target thought occurrences were always preceded by a chosen replacement 
thought. This latter finding prompted speculation that the observed paradoxical effect of 
suppression results from the association of the target thought with distracter thoughts 
that become cues for the target thought. In order to examine this hypothesis, in a second 
study participants were given the additional instruction to distract themselves from the 
target thought by replacing it with thoughts about a Volkswagen. Wegner and colleagues 
found that when the distracter search was restricted to one thought the rebound effect 
did not occur.
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Wegner et al. (1991) repeated the original study but manipulated the experimental envi­
ronment across intervals. For some participants, salient contextual cues were present 
during both the first and second intervals, whereas for others the contextual cues were 
removed prior to the second session. They found that participants instructed to suppress 
in Interval 1 had more white bear thoughts during expression (i.e., showed a greater re­
bound effect) when the salient contextual cues present during suppression were re-intro­
duced, whereas reintroduction of the cues had no effect on thought frequency of those 
who had previously expressed. This offered further evidence that thoughts “rebound” be­
cause of their association with environmental stimuli.
Mood state also appears to affect the nature and availability of potential distracters. Wen­
zlaff, Wegner, and Roper (1988) predicted that thought suppression efforts will be im­
paired by use of distracters that are emotionally related to the target thought. They exam­
ined depressed and nondepressed participants who were instructed to suppress or not 
suppress positive and negative thoughts. In a second interval, all participants were in­
structed to express their target thought. This design is a 2 (Interval 1 instructions) by 2 
(target thought valence) by 2 (Interval, within Ss factor) mixed design. As predicted, par­
ticipants who were depressed had more frequent target thought occurrences; and after 
the suppression interval, the depressed group experienced more negative (but not posi­
tive) thoughts. A series of studies has since found that participants in a dysphoric mood 
have more difficulty suppressing negative thoughts than participants in a pleasant mood 
(Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulus, 1991; Howell & Conway, 1992; Reynolds & Salkovskis, 
1991; Sutherland, Newman, & Rachman, 1982).
Wenzlaff, Wegner, and Klein (1991) then examined whether or not the rebound effect 
would be stronger when mood state during suppression was reinstated. Participants un­
derwent a mood induction and were then required to either suppress or express white 
bear thoughts. After a fifteen-minute interval, a second mood induction was administered 
in order to either reinstate the same mood as existed in the suppression/expression exer­
cise, or to induce the opposite mood. All participants were then instructed to express the 
white bear thoughts. The rebound effect was strongest for those whose mood was congru­
ent with the mood induced during suppression. A second study found that expression of 
thoughts after suppression resulted in a shift to the mood state that existed during sup­
pression, suggesting that mood state influenced the nature of the thoughts that are cho­
sen as distracters. Taken together, these data suggested to Wegner and colleagues that 
thought control efforts are influenced by the nature of the “to-be-suppressed” thought 
(i.e., mood-congruent versus incongruent), by the existence of a negative mood state, and 
by the number, saliency and range of external stimuli available to assist the individual in 
the search for distracting thoughts.
Wegner (1992, 1994) proposed that two primary processes are involved in the suppres­
sion of a thought. He referred to the first process as the “controlled distracter search.” 
This is a deliberate and conscious process that involves: (a) the search for thoughts that 
are not the target thought, and (b) the maintenance of the chosen replacement thought in 
consciousness. Wegner also argued that the controlled distracter search is essentially un­
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focused and will stop at the first available distracter. Each occurrence of the target 
thought will prompt a search for a new distracter. Thus, stimuli that are salient are more 
likely to capture attention and serve as distracters. Due to the association between the 
target thought and distracter thoughts, the success of the controlled distracter search 
will be influenced by the availability of potentially distracting external and internal stim­
uli. The second process involved in thought suppression is the “automatic target 
search” (Wegner, 1992; Wegner & Erber, 1993), which is a nonconscious process instigat­
ed to test for failures of the controlled distracter search. It seeks out both the target 
thought itself as well as “thought traces” and does not cease until suppression is no 
longer necessary. Once suppression efforts have been initiated the automatic target 
search begins “scanning” one’s consciousness for material that is relevant to the target 
thought. As various cues become associated with the thought, more and more stimuli be­
come relevant to it. Through this process, the target search actually comes to evoke the 
thought itself. In a series of studies Page, Locke, and Trio (2005) demonstrated the hyper-
accessibility of “to be suppressed” thoughts and that effective reduction of unwanted 
thoughts relies on availability of material incongruent with emotional state.
Given that the controlled distracter search requires attentional resources, Wegner and 
Erber (1992) hypothesized that cognitive load—or any tax on working memory—will 
thwart it. To test this, participants were instructed to suppress specific words while per­
forming a word association task that included words related to the ones participants were 
to suppress. When participants had to complete the word association task under strict 
time pressure (i.e., high-demand condition), they were much more likely to respond with 
the word they had been instructed to suppress than when they were under relaxed (low-
demand) conditions. Wegner and Erber (1992) concluded that the controlled distracter 
search is vulnerable to disruption once attentional resources are taxed. At the same time, 
the automatic target search will not be similarly disrupted because it is nonconscious.
In summary, Wegner (1992, 1994) asserted that the controlled distracter search: (a) is as­
sisted by the nature and availability of potentially distracting stimuli; (b) draws on the 
individual’s current concerns and consciously accessible items; (c) is essentially unfo­
cused, stopping at the first potential distracter; (d) is more successful when the selected 
distracter is semantically or affectively distant from the unwanted thought; and, (e) is 
likely to depend on the individual’s ability to internally generate new distracters that are 
distant from unwanted thoughts. Wegner (2009) concluded that the controlled distracter 
search and automatic target search operate synchronously most of the time, and thus 
thought suppression is successful more often than not. Suppression fails under conditions 
of cognitive load.
Current Status
Since these initial investigations the ironic effect of suppression (or, the “white bear” ef­
fect) has been accepted as psychological fact. However, the ironic effect of suppression 
has not been reliably observed, particularly with respect to suppression of the repetitive, 
unwanted thoughts characteristic of mood and anxiety disorders (see Purdon, 1999, 2004; 
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Rassin, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2000). Abramowitz, Tolin, and Street (2001) conducted a 
meta-analysis of controlled studies of thought suppression, finding a small-to-moderate 
rebound effect of thought suppression but no immediate enhancement effect of suppres­
sion on frequency. However, the effect sizes were heavily influenced by experimental arti­
fact. Studies that used thought expression instructions (i.e., instructions to actively gen­
erate the thought) as opposed to “think anything” instructions (i.e., think anything you 
like, including the target thought) had a greater rebound effect. Studies in which thought 
frequency was assessed by overt means (e.g., stream of consciousness reporting, ringing 
a bell when the thought occurred) exhibited a greater rebound effect than studies that 
used more covert means (e.g., pressing a key when the thought occurs). The rebound ef­
fect was stronger for studies in which participants were suppressing thoughts about an 
entire story rather than suppressing a specific, discrete thought. Finally, Abramowitz et 
al. (2001) found no difference in the size of the rebound effect whether the target thought 
was emotionally relevant or neutral, nor was the effect size different across clinical and 
nonclinical samples. The latter is consistent with Magee, Harden, and Teachman (2012) 
who conducted a meta-analysis precisely to determine whether the effect sizes are bigger 
in samples of people with mood and anxiety difficulties, and found no differences.
Methodological Issues
There are a number of important methodological issues that bear on our understanding of 
thought suppression and the meaning of the observed effects. Purdon (1999, 2004) pro­
vided a review of methodological issues and considerations in studying thought suppres­
sion, particularly suppression of emotionally relevant thoughts characteristic of OCD. 
These include: the experimental design used, the emotional relevance of the target 
thought studied, motivation to suppress the target thought, defining thought occur­
rences, the nature of the experimental instructions, long-term versus immediate effects of 
suppression, validity of thought frequency as an index of mental control/thought intru­
siveness, and the strategies people use to suppress.
Experimental Design
Wegner et al.’s (1987) original study used a cross-over, or, Latin Square design, as depict­
ed in Table 1.
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Table 1. Wegner et al.’s (1987) Experimental Design








The cross-over design is inappropriate if the interaction of time with the between-partici­
pants variable is to be interpreted because the interaction confounds time with experi­
mental instruction. As observed by Clark, Ball, and Pape (1991) practice effects cannot be 
ruled out as causal factors in any observed rebound effect when a cross-over design has 
been used, nor can ceiling effects. For example, if people express a thought in the first in­
terval they may produce it less during the second (suppression interval) due to habitua­
tion or exhaustion, when their counterparts who had previously suppressed are now ex­
pressing. Many studies thus use a mix between and within Ss paradigm, as depicted in 
Table 2.
Table 2. Mixed Between and Within Ss Design

















Of central importance in the use of such a design is that the within-subjects change in 
thought occurrences across control and suppression conditions is actually assessed. As 
Merckelbach et al. (1991); Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994); and Trinder and Salkovskis 
(1994) observed, if suppression results in an increase in thought occurrences, the optimal 
test is to determine whether participants actually experience a significant increase across 
time.
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In these studies people instructed to suppress did report more thought occurrences dur­
ing suppression than those who simply monitored their thoughts. However, there was no 
within-participants increase in thought occurrences following suppression, nor was fre­
quency during suppression negatively correlated with frequency during the subsequent 
interval. In fact, Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) found strong positive correlations be­
tween frequency in each interval, which indicates carry-over effects, an effect that has 
since been observed by others (e.g., Ju and Lien, 2016; Muris et al., 1997). Some studies 
have used a pure within-participants design in which all participants suppress and then 
monitor with no suppression (e.g., Brewin & Beaton, 2002; Brewin & Smart, 2005), but 
this design does not allow for control of practice effects, or, in the case where the target 
thought is an emotional thought, habituation. Baeyens (2006) conducted a meta-analysis 
examining effect sizes for between- versus within-participant comparisons, and found no 
effect of suppression on frequency, either during or following suppression.
Emotional Relevance of the Target Thought
Studies of the ironic effect of suppression sometimes have participants suppress an emo­
tionally neutral thought, such as a white bear, as in the original study of Wegner et al. 
(1987). Many studies, though, examine suppression of emotionally relevant thoughts, 
such as worries, ruminative thoughts, thoughts about traumatic events, obsessional 
thoughts, among others. The emotional relevance of the thought is an important consider­
ation. Edwards and Dickerson (1987) argued that personally relevant thoughts are more 
attentionally engaging and therefore will be more difficult to dismiss. To test this, they ex­
amined latency to replace a neutral thought with an obsessional thought and vice versa. 
Consistent with their prediction, latency to replace was longer when participants were in­
structed to replace an obsessional thought with a neutral thought. Wegner et al. (1990) 
found that participants who thought about sex showed a significant increase in skin con­
ductance levels (SCL) from baseline whereas those asked to think about less exciting 
thoughts did not. Meanwhile, those instructed to suppress sex thoughts reported signifi­
cantly fewer thoughts than those instructed to express but uniquely showed a greater in­
crease in SCL in response to sex-thought occurrence, and in a subsequent study this ef­
fect was observed even 30 minutes later. No SCL increases were observed in those in­
structed to express their thoughts about sex. This suggests that suppression may inter­
fere with extinction of the emotional response but also that suppressing itself is not emo­
tionally neutral.
Cioffi and Holloway (1993) had participants place their arms in a tank filled with ice and 
instructed them to either monitor the ensuing physical sensations, suppress all thoughts 
of the sensations, or to concentrate on their room at home (specific distraction condition). 
They found that suppression of thoughts about the pain was associated with higher rat­
ings of pain for two minutes after immersion in the ice and with heightened physiological 
response, as compared to monitoring the sensations or using a specific distracter. Fur­
thermore, participants who had suppressed thoughts about their sensations responded 
more negatively to the experimenter’s (bogus) report that they would have to do the task 
again and showed a greater increase in physiological reactivity upon hearing this news, 
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and reported lower self-efficacy for coping with the pain after the second immersion than 
did participants in the other conditions. Finally, participants in the suppression condition 
rated a neutral sensation as significantly more unpleasant than did the other participants. 
However, Harvey and McGuire (2000) found no ironic effect of suppression of thoughts 
about chronic pain.
Some studies have compared the effects of suppression on neutral versus emotionally rel­
evant thoughts. Muris et al. (1992) examined the immediate and later effects of suppres­
sion of thoughts about a neutral story and suppression of thoughts about an emotional 
story. No ironic effects of suppression were observed on the frequency of thoughts about 
an emotional story, but suppression of thoughts about the neutral story did result in a re­
bound effect. Electrodermal activity did not vary according to valence of the target 
thought or suppress group. On the other hand, Rutledge, Hollenberg, and Hancock 
(1993) compared suppression of white bear thoughts to thoughts about an upcoming test 
and found no ironic effect of suppression on either type of thought. In their meta-analysis, 
Abramowitz et al. (2001) found no difference in the effect of suppressing emotionally rele­
vant versus neutral thoughts.
One factor that the above studies do not address is the individual’s history with the target 
thought. When a thought is emotionally relevant people will have experienced it (or 
thoughts like it) in the past and are likely to have preexisting strategies for handling it. 
Although Wegner’s model argues that the controlled distracter search is unfocused, there 
have been no empirical tests of this tenet. It may be that people have a clear strategy for 
suppressing, particularly thoughts that they have had to suppress in the past. Further­
more, emotionally relevant thoughts are connected to mood and to associative networks 
of memories and prepotent responses. It may be the case that whereas suppression of 
neutral thoughts may rely on use of external stimuli as distracters, suppression of emo­
tionally relevant thoughts that are connected to mood state relies on use of internal stim­
uli (i.e., thoughts, moods, and memories) as distracters. Finally, people may respond quite 
differently to emotionally relevant thoughts depending on situational context and current 
internal (e.g., emotional) and external goals. Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) in fact ar­
gued that “motivated and intrusion focused monitoring of consciousness may be as impor­
tant as suppression” (p. 1) in understanding the persistence of unwanted thoughts.
Motivation to Suppress
The term “thought suppression” typically refers to active attempts to get rid of a thought 
as opposed to simply being aware of a thought and ignoring or deeming it not relevant for 
further processing (i.e., not engaging it). For example, in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders, fifth edition (DSM-V; American Psychiatric Association, 
2013) one criterion for obsessions is that the person “attempts to ignore or
suppress” [emphasis added] them. The assumption implicit in the term is that the thought 
being suppressed is unwanted in some way. However, that does not mean that the 
thought is necessarily negative, only that it is unwanted in the moment. A person may 
well suppress a positive thought that occurs during a solemn occasion.
Thought Suppression
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Fear that a thought will produce undesirable action is said to be a central motive for 
thought suppression (e.g., Wegner, 2009). Interestingly, although these two motives have 
been assumed, there has been little systematic study of people’s motives for suppressing. 
Purdon, Rowa, and Antony (2007) had people with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
keep a record of their thought suppression attempts over three days using a semi-struc­
tured diary. The diary asked participants to report whether the attempt was proactive or 
reactive, and to record, verbatim, their reasons for suppressing. The majority of attempts 
were reactive (74%) with 24% proactive. The most common motive for suppressing obses­
sional thoughts was to get rid of the thought before the compulsion became necessary. 
The second most common motive was to prevent obsessional thoughts and/or anxiety/dis­
tress from escalating; that is, suppression was used to regulate emotion. The other mo­
tive listed was to prevent a bad outcome, which may be characteristic of OCD in particu­
lar, and reflect the view that thinking something can make it happen, and that thinking 
something is as wrong, morally, as doing the action (e.g., Rachman, 1997).
In her review, Purdon (1999) observed that people may not be motivated to suppress their 
unwanted thoughts. For example, Papageorgiou and Wells (2001) argued that people hold 
positive beliefs about the utility of rumination, and research indicates that people with 
depression do not attempt to disengage from depressive rumination (e.g., Koster et al., 
2011). In fact, it has been argued that rumination is an attempt to resolve problems and 
is thus viewed as necessary and important to engage in (e.g., Andrews & Thompson, 
2009). Meanwhile, people who report that their worry is unwanted also hold positive be­
liefs about the importance and necessity of engaging that worry (e.g., Borkovec, Hazlett-
Stevens, & Diaz, 1999; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001; Wells, 2005). Attempts to control 
worry may be initiated when anxiety becomes high, when worry interferes with other im­
portant tasks, and/or when it reaches saturation. Research on the suppression of worry or 
worrylike thoughts has consistently failed to detect a rebound effect (e.g., Behar, Vescio, 
& Borkovec, 2005; Kelly & Kahn, 1994; McLean & Broomfield, 2007; Rutledge, 1998) and 
in fact has been associated with a decrease in worry (Roemer & Borkovec, 1994) and an 
increase in neutral and pleasant thoughts (Mathews & Milroy, 1994).1 Similarly, replace­
ment of worry with positive thoughts has been found to ameliorate clinically significant 
worry (Eagleson et al., 2016). Cougle et al. (2005) had participants with social anxiety 
suppress worries about an undesired social outcome or think anything, and when either 
anticipating giving a speech or not anticipating giving a speech. Contrary to hypotheses, 
there was no rebound effect of suppression; and in fact, participants anticipating giving a 
speech had fewer thought occurrences when they suppressed.
At the same time, people are highly motivated to suppress other types of thoughts, such 
as thoughts about a phobic stimulus, traumatic memories, and obsessional thoughts. Pur­
don (1999) concluded that suppression of trauma-relevant thoughts and memories has 
been reliably associated with an ironic increase in frequency in both analogue samples, 
those exposed to trauma, and those with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It has 
been replicated in more recent work (e.g., Beck et al., 2006) although not consistently 
(e.g., Guthrei & Bryant, 2000; Rosenthal & Follette, 2007). In a large-scale study, thought 
suppression has been identified as a risk factor for development of posttraumatic stress 
Thought Suppression
Page 10 of 31
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, PSYCHOLOGY (oxfordre.com/psychology). (c) Oxford University 
Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy 
Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-USA Mirror; date: 03 February 2020
disorder in children and adolescents following trauma exposure (e.g., Trickey et al., 
2010). However, use of suppression may simply reflect symptom severity in that the un­
wanted thoughts may be substantially more vivid, disturbing, and frequent, thereby giv­
ing rise to greater suppression effort.
Results have been even less consistent across studies of the impact of suppression of ob­
sessional thoughts on frequency. Some studies of nonclinical participants found that sup­
pression was associated with an immediate increase in the frequency of obsessional 
thoughts during suppression (i.e., immediate enhancement) (Salkovskis & Campbell, 
1994; Brewin & Smart, 2005) or a subsequent increase in frequency or rebound (Grisham 
& Williams, 2009; Trinder & Salkovskis, 1994), whereas others found no ironic effect of 
suppression either during or after suppression (e.g., Belloch, Morillo, & Giménez, 2004; 
Purdon, 2001; Purdon & Clark, 2001). Furthermore, Salkovskis and colleagues found a 
strong carry-over effect of thought frequency across experimental intervals. To date, stud­
ies of people diagnosed with OCD have not found an ironic effect of suppression on fre­
quency of obsessional thoughts either during or after suppression (e.g., Janeck & Cala­
mari, 1999; Najmi, Riemann, & Wegner, 2009; Purdon, Rowa, & Antony, 2005). Finally, in 
his nonclinical sample, Rassin (2001) found that suppression of an induced obsessional 
thought (“I hope X [loved one] gets into a car accident”) was associated with fewer
thought occurrences.
Motivation to suppress a particular type of thought may vary considerably across people 
and circumstance. For example, people who are attempting to restrain their eating may 
be motivated to suppress thoughts about food out of concern that thinking about a tempt­
ing food will result in diet violation, or that thinking about food may cause them to actual­
ly gain weight (e.g., Coelho et al., 2012). On the other hand, if people are hungry they 
may be motivated to think about food. Indeed, Xu, Purdon, Rowe, and Smilek (2019) 
found that 75% of restrained eaters in their sample reported strong motivation to look at 
pictures of tempting food and low motivation to avoid looking at them. Research on the 
impact of suppression of food relevant thoughts has yielded mixed findings. Harnden, Mc­
Nally, and Jimerson (1997) found that suppression versus expression of the thought of be­
ing weighed was associated with thought rebound in non-dieters but not in dieters, 
whereas O’Connell et al. (2005) and Soetens and Braet (2006) did not find an ironic effect 
of suppression of food relevant thoughts.
Defining Thought Occurrences
Wegner and Zanakos (1994) developed the white bear suppression inventory (WBSI) to 
assess trait tendency to respond to unwanted thoughts by suppressing them. The WBSI 
correlates with symptom measures of psychopathology, which has bolstered confidence in 
the ironic processes model. However, one difficulty with the WBSI is that it confounds the 
tendency to suppress thoughts with tendency to experience thoughts one wants to sup­
press. In their factor analysis of the measure, Schmidt et al. (2009) identified two factors, 
which they labelled “intrusion” (tendency to experience unwanted thoughts) and 
“suppression” (tendency to suppress thoughts). Consistent with a number of previous 
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studies, only the “intrusion” factor was correlated with measures of anxiety and depres­
sion.
Barnes, Fisak, and Tantleff-Dunn (2010) developed a measure of trait suppression of food-
related thoughts. The food thought suppression inventory (FTSI) has been associated with 
weight outcomes (e.g., Barnes et al., 2010). Barnes, Masheb, and Grilo (2011) found that 
women (as opposed to men) and people with binge eating disorders (as opposed to those 
without binge eating disorders) reported greater food suppression. However, as with the 
WBSI, tendency to suppress thoughts may be confounded with tendency to have unwant­
ed thoughts about food. One further problem with trait measures of suppression is that 
people may not be especially good at accurately reporting the extent to which they use 
suppression, particularly as suppression may be quite automatic. Furthermore, if sup­
pression succeeds, the thought may be gone before it has fully commanded attentional re­
sources and awareness. Thus, retrospective self-reports may not reliably account for suc­
cessful suppression.
In thought suppression experiments, several methods have been used to assess thought 
occurrences. In some studies, participants signal when the target thought occurs and 
then signal when it is gone (e.g., Nixon et al., 2009). A difficulty with this method is that 
signaling a thought’s absence primes the thought, artificially inflating thought frequency. 
In the majority of studies, thought occurrences are assessed using stream of conscious­
ness verbalization or written stream of consciousness, or event marking, in which partici­
pants mark each occurrence of the thought by ringing a bell, pressing a computer key, or 
clicking a counter. Sometimes both are used, such that participants speak their stream of 
consciousness and mark thought occurrences with a counter or write their stream of con­
sciousness and mark occurrences with a stroke in the margin. Muris, Merckelbach, and 
de Jong (1993) compared stream of consciousness verbalization to event marking and did 
not find any difference in results. Stream of consciousness verbalization/writing is the 
more cumbersome of the two methods as it requires that participants practice, and the 
verbatim material must be coded. This in turn requires a system that reliably operational­
izes and identifies a target thought. For example, does a mention of “bear” or of an object 
that is white count as a “white bear” thought, and how would the participant classify it? 
On the other hand, it does allow for examination of thoughts that precede target thought 
intrusions, which, for example, revealed to Wegner and colleagues that people tended to 
distract themselves from the target thought with thoughts about stimuli in the room.
Meanwhile, there are three difficulties with event marking. First, Salkovskis and Camp­
bell (1994) observed that signaling that a target thought has occurred cues it, perhaps es­
pecially when the signal is quite salient, such as ringing a bell, thinking aloud, or marking 
its occurrences in the margins of a page where the marks serve as a visual cue for the 
thought. Second, when people know they are supposed to suppress they may underreport 
thought occurrences, particularly when the signal is not private, again such as when ring­
ing a bell. It is also possible that people use different standards to determine whether a 
thought has occurred such that when suppressing they may choose to only report vivid or 
Thought Suppression
Page 12 of 31
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, PSYCHOLOGY (oxfordre.com/psychology). (c) Oxford University 
Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy 
Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-USA Mirror; date: 03 February 2020
complete mental representations of the thought in order to help the researcher by ap­
pearing compliant with instructions.
Third, Markowitz and Purdon (2008) observed that thought frequency is confounded with 
thought duration, such that one participant may experience one thought occurrence that 
lasts much of the interval, whereas someone else may have several thought occurrences 
that are readily dismissed. However, in current paradigms that use event marking the for­
mer would be interpreted as evidence of good thought control whereas the latter is ar­
guably an indicator of greater thought control. Some studies have thus examined latency 
to dismiss a thought rather than thought frequency (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987; Purdon 
et al., 2011). In these studies, participants were instructed to monitor their thoughts, and 
when the target thought occurred they were to signal by pressing a button and then re­
place it with another thought, prescribed by the experimenter. Once the replacement 
thought was in mind, they would signal again by pressing a different button. However, in 
such paradigms participants are instructed to dismiss using one specific distracter, so it 
does not allow for examination of natural, or spontaneous, active resistance to the 
thought, nor for examination of participants’ natural suppression strategies.
Markowitz and Purdon (2008) studied natural active resistance to obsessional thoughts in 
an unselected sample. They first primed participants’ most upsetting obsessional thought 
and then had them monitored for six minutes, during which they wrote their stream of 
consciousness. After the interval, participants rated how hard they had tried to suppress 
the thought. A large subset of participants was contacted four hours later and reported 
on the frequency of and distress caused by the obsessional though since leaving the lab. 
There was no correlation between suppression effort reported in the lab and self-reported 
occurrences or distress afterward.
Experimental Instructions
The nature of the control and experimental instructions used in thought suppression par­
adigms are of central importance to the reliability and validity of results. One concern is 
priming effects. In some studies using stream of consciousness verbalization, participants 
in the suppression condition are given explicit instructions to suppress the target 
thought, which is mentioned by name; whereas those in the control condition are simply 
asked to think aloud (e.g., Johnston, Bulik, & Anstiss, 1999). Suppression instructions may 
thus serve as a prime for the target thought, again artificially inflating thought occur­
rences relative to no priming. Furthermore, Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) noted that 
marking thought occurrences also appears to prime thoughts, as participants have more 
target thoughts during the 6 to 12 minutes of monitoring than in the past few months 
combined. Finally, when participants monitor only without marking occurrences (such as 
when verbalization is used without marking) those in the suppress condition are likely to 
be vigilant for target thought occurrences, whereas those in the control condition have no 
reason to be vigilant for it. A paradigm in which the target thought is mentioned the same 
number of times in the control condition as in the suppression condition, and in which 
participants in all conditions mark target thought occurrences, better controls for these 
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confounds. However, researchers need to assume that any instruction to monitor a specif­
ic thought will prime its occurrence.
The reader will also recall that Abramowitz et al. (2001) found that the suppression effect 
was greater in studies that used thought expression as a control condition for thought 
suppression, which they interpreted to be an artifact. As previously noted, ceiling effects 
may result in a decline in thoughts for those who express, and this in turn could account 
for significant differences between groups during a second interval, especially when the 
within-participants effects are not examined, which stacks the deck for a rebound effect. 
Rassin et al. (2005) compared expression versus think anything instructions and found an 
ironic effect for expression, but not for think anything. On the other hand, Erskine et al. 
(2012) compared suppression, expression, and think anything instructions on the frequen­
cy of thoughts about smoking in participants who smoked. Effects on frequency were 
marginal, but whereas suppression was associated with greater thought frequency than 
think anything, expression was not.
Lavy and van den Hout (1990) recommended instead that participants be instructed to 
“think anything.” However, as noted by Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994) one problem with 
studying thoughts that naturally give rise to active resistance is that both control and 
suppress groups will engage in suppression. In their study of suppression of thoughts 
about smoking in smokers they found considerable spontaneous suppression effort in the 
non-suppress condition, which they controlled for statistically by removing low suppres­
sors in the suppress condition and high suppressors in the control condition. The same 
pattern of results occurred, though, with higher thought occurrences for those who sup­
pressed in both intervals (i.e., no rebound effect, but an overall enhancement effect). In a 
pilot study of obsessional thoughts, Purdon and Clark (2001) found that when partici­
pants’ most upsetting obsessional thought was primed, those instructed to “think any­
thing you like” reported the same effort to suppress the thought as those instructed to 
suppress. Marcks and Woods (2007) also found that participants given “think anything” 
instructions reported considerable spontaneous suppression. Similarly, Muris et al. (1997) 
found that participants with spider phobia, as compared to those without spider phobia, 
reported greater suppression effort in both suppress and control intervals.
Purdon and Clark (2001) recommended that instructions for the suppression control con­
dition specify that participants should not suppress any thoughts, including the obsession­
al thought. In studies using these instructions, one study found an ironic effect of sup­
pression on the frequency of an experimentally induced blasphemous thought in people 
high, but not low, in religiosity (Corcoran & Woody, 2009). However, other studies using 
these instructions have found no effect of suppression on frequency of obsessional 
thoughts in nonclinical (Belloch, et al., 2004; Hardy & Brewin, 2005; Purdon, 2001; Pur­
don & Clark, 2001) or clinical samples (Purdon et al., 2005).
The “do not suppress” instructions, too, are problematic when studying thoughts that 
give rise to natural active resistance. Tolin et al. (2002) observed that for the suppress 
group, suppression instructions are a non-intervention whereas they are an active inter­
Thought Suppression
Page 14 of 31
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, PSYCHOLOGY (oxfordre.com/psychology). (c) Oxford University 
Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited. Please see applicable Privacy 
Policy and Legal Notice (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-USA Mirror; date: 03 February 2020
vention for the do not suppress group. To get around this, they examined the effects of 
suppression of neutral (white bear) thoughts in a sample of people with OCD as com­
pared to anxious and nonanxious control groups. They found that people with OCD had 
more white bear thoughts overall and had more thought occurrences during suppression 
compared to baseline (i.e., exhibited an immediate enhancement effect). No immediate 
enhancement or rebound effect was observed in the other two groups.
To overcome the problem of relying on participants’ self-report of target thought occur­
rences, Tolin et al. (2002) conducted a second study in which they examined sensitivity to 
thought-related stimuli. Participants were instructed to suppress a white bear thought 
and then were given a lexical decision task that included words relevant to white bears, 
words not relevant to white bears, and non-words. They hypothesized that people with 
OCD would be more vulnerable to target thought primes, as evidenced by lower latency 
to respond to stimuli relevant to the white bear relative to other stimuli. As predicted, the 
differential response was observed in the OCD group but not in the other two groups. 
Tolin and colleagues concluded that individuals with OCD appear to have a general deficit 
in their ability to control thoughts.
The general deficit model in OCD is difficult to reconcile with the fact that people with 
OCD function normally outside their obsessive-compulsive cycles; they do not have trou­
ble controlling all unwanted thoughts, only their obsessional thoughts. Other studies have 
not found high obsessionality to be associated with difficulty controlling other types of 
thoughts (e.g., Smari, Sigurjonsdottir, & Saemundsdottir, 1994) and in fact some have 
found high obsessionality to be associated with better thought control, albeit in a nonclin­
ical sample (e.g., Rutledge, Hancock, & Rutledge, 1996). Another explanation for the 
Tolin et al. findings is that people who experience unwanted thoughts are vigilant for 
thought-related stimuli, just as someone with a phobia is vigilant for stimuli relevant to 
the object of their phobia. Indeed, Janeck et al. (2003) found that individuals with OCD 
showed a greater tendency to be aware of and evaluate negative thinking than people 
with generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Clayton, Richards, and Edwards (1999) found 
that individuals with OCD, as compared to anxious controls, were less well able to selec­
tively ignore competing internal and external stimuli. Thus, when people are highly moti­
vated to prevent a thought from occurring and to dismiss it as quickly as possible when it 
does occur, they may be especially sensitive to thoughts and thought triggers. This is con­
sistent with the well-accepted idea that anxiety is characterized by attentional capture of 
threat cues (e.g., Fox et al., 2001).
Long Term Effects of Suppression
Most thought suppression studies examine the impact of a brief (typically three- to six-
minute) interval of suppression on thought occurrences during an interval of the same 
length that immediately follows. As previously discussed, in real life people suppress fre­
quently and perhaps for longer periods. Few studies have examined longer-term effects of 
suppression. Trinder and Salkovskis (1994) found that suppression in the lab was associ­
ated with greater frequency of obsessional thoughts four days later. However, Markowitz 
and Purdon (2008) did not find that natural active resistance to an obsessional thought 
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predicted thought occurrences outside the lab four hours later, nor did Rosenthal and Fol­
lette (2007) find that suppression of thoughts relevant to a recent sexual assault was as­
sociated with more occurrences of those thoughts over the next two days. To improve the 
ecological validity of in-session experiments, some researchers have introduced multiple 
suppress/control cycles, which afford examination of the impact of repeated suppression. 
Hardy and Brewin (2005) examined the impact of two cycles of suppression on the fre­
quency of obsessional thoughts in participants high and low in obsessional symptoms. No 
rebound effect was observed for either group, although whereas thought frequency de­
creased during suppression for those low in symptoms, it did not decrease during sup­
pression for those high in symptoms. Similarly, Williams and Moulds (2007) found no ef­
fect of multiple cycles of suppression in their study of distressing images in people with 
dysphoria.
Is Thought Frequency a Valid Index of Thought Control?
As previously noted, some studies have attempted to get around the confound of thought 
frequency with duration by examining thought duration (Edwards & Dickerson, 1987; 
Purdon et al., 2011; Williams & Moulds, 2007). Some researchers have examined the im­
pact of suppression on subsequent behavior. For example, Erskine and Georgiou (2010) 
examined the impact of suppression of thoughts about chocolate on subsequent chocolate 
consumption in restrained versus non-restrained eaters. Participants either suppressed, 
expressed, or simply monitored thoughts about chocolate, after which they were asked to 
sample and rate two brands of chocolate. They found that restrained (but not unre­
strained) eaters instructed to suppress thoughts about chocolate subsequently ate more 
chocolate than those who expressed thoughts about chocolate or those given no instruc­
tions. Erskine et al. (2012) examined the impact of suppression on tobacco craving in 
smokers who had suppressed thoughts about smoking but found no relationship. Similar­
ly, Siep et al. (2012) found that suppression did not lead to greater food cravings. Other 
studies have examined the impact of suppression on physiological variables. Garland et 
al. (2012) examined heart rate variability in participants undergoing treatment for alco­
hol dependence. They found that high trait suppression (WBSI scores) and high suppres­
sion of urges to drink when viewing alcohol-related photos was associated with lower 
heart-rate variability.
Although there has been little systematic research on the reasons for wanting to suppress 
thoughts, it can reasonably be argued that the thought is suppressed because it is viewed 
as a threat to current goals. For example, it might lead to undesirable behavior, it repre­
sents possibilities/events one wishes to avoid (as in anxiety and phobias), it is disgusting 
or abhorrent, and/or because thinking about it will have an adverse effect on mood. Some 
researchers have thus examined the impact of failed suppression attempts on appraisal of 
the thought itself, one’s mental faculties, and mood. In their studies with nonclinical sam­
ples and clinical samples of people with OCD Purdon and Clark (2001; Purdon et al., 
2005) did not find a paradoxical effect of suppression on the frequency of obsessional 
thoughts. However, after each interval they administered a measure of concerns over fail­
ures in thought control. Controlling for baseline mood, they found that concerns over fail­
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ures in thought control predicted suppression effort reported by those in the “do not sup­
press any thoughts” group, discomfort over thought occurrences regardless of group, and 
more negative mood state at the end of the study. Similarly, in their study of thought dis­
missability, Purdon et al. (2011) found that in participants with OCD concern over difficul­
ties dismissing the obsessional thought, but not thought frequency or dismissability, pre­
dicted a decline in mood state.
Belloch et al. (2004) also observed no paradoxical effect of suppression on the frequency 
of obsessional thoughts, but found that for those who suppressed, subjective success at 
managing the thought was lower and the intrusiveness of the thought was higher. Marcks 
and Woods (2005, 2007) found no significant effect of suppression, control, or accep­
tance-based instructions on frequency, but Marcks and Woods (2005) found that whereas 
distress over the thought decreased for participants receiving acceptance instructions, it 
increased for participants who suppressed (and did not change for those in the control 
condition), controlling for baseline distress. Marcks and Woods (2007) found that accep­
tance was associated with greater willingness to re-experience the thought. Najmi, et al. 
(2009) found that distress over intrusions was higher in participants with OCD under sup­
pression versus acceptance or focused distraction instructions. In their study comparing 
suppress versus do not suppress blasphemous thoughts Corcoran and Woody (2009) 
found that suppression was uniquely associated with poorer mood state and greater anxi­
ety. Abramowitz et al. (2001) found that people with OCD were more likely to make nega­
tive, internal attributions about thought control failures (e.g., “I am weak”). Magee and 
Teachman (2007) found that participants who reported negative appraisal of the recur­
rence of obsessional, other personally relevant thoughts, and white bear thoughts, report­
ed greater distress and greater thought frequency than those who did not report this ap­
praisal. However, these findings have not been consistent, with some studies finding no 
impact of suppression on mood (e.g., Rosenthal & Follette, 2007). In her meta-analysis 
Baeyens (2006) did not find that suppression led to an increase in negative affect, al­
though she notes that so few studies have examined this her analysis had low power to 
detect significant effects.
Thought Suppression Strategies
The term “thought suppression” refers to any attempt to get rid of a thought. As noted 
above, few thought suppression studies have examined the strategies people use to sup­
press their thoughts. Freeston et al. (1995) interviewed an unselected sample about the 
strategies they used to manage obsessional thoughts, identifying the following: physical 
action, thought replacement, analyzing the thought, talking to others, thought stopping, 
reason with self, and doing nothing. Ladouceur et al. (2000) conducted structured inter­
views with people with OCD, people with an anxiety disorder, and healthy volunteers 
about the strategies they used to manage their most troubling thoughts. The strategies 
ranged from overt compulsions and mental checking (more likely to be used in the OCD 
sample) to distraction and replacement with a positive thought (less likely to be used by 
the OCD group), saying “stop,” self-questioning, relaxation, distracting conversations, and 
doing nothing.
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Purdon and Clark (1993) conducted semi-structured interviews with nonclinical individu­
als about the content of obsessional thoughts they have experienced (if any) and their 
cognitive, affective, and behavioral response to them. They found that participants report­
ed using the following strategies: overt distraction (talking to someone, looking at some­
thing else), covert distraction (thinking about something else), overt neutralizing (wash­
ing hands, checking), covert neutralizing (replacing a “bad” thought with a good one, or 
mentally undoing the thought in some way), reasoning, seeking reassurance from others, 
self-reassurance, saying a prayer, saying “stop,” and doing nothing.
Wells and Davies (1994) observed that thought suppression is a goal, but the means to 
that goal is of central importance to understanding the persistence of unwanted thoughts. 
They developed the Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ) to assess the strategies people 
use to control thoughts, based on interviews with 10 people with an anxiety disorder. 
They identified 59 strategies, which were subjected to factor analysis, yielding six fac­
tors: behavioral distraction, cognitive distraction, social/reassurance, reappraisal, worry, 
and punishment. The latter two scales were most highly associated with psychopathology, 
which has since been observed in other studies (e.g., Amir, Cashman, & Foa, 1997; Bel­
loch, Morilla, & Gracia-Soriano, 2009; Rassin & Diepstraten, 2003). Similarly, Jacoby et 
al. (2016) found that use of punishment actually mediated the relationship between ap­
praisal of repugnant obsessional thoughts and the severity of OCD symptoms in a large 
sample of people with OCD.
However, in much of the thought suppression literature, participants are simply instruct­
ed to suppress their thought; how they do so is left up to them and is typically not as­
sessed. Wegner’s model predicts that use of a single distracter will result in less rebound 
than multiple distracters, as the materials used in distraction become cues for the 
thoughts later on. As observed earlier, Wegner et al. (1987) found that participants in­
structed to replace the white bear thought with the word “Volkswagen” did not exhibit a 
rebound effect. In Lavy and van den Hout (1990) participants were instructed not to use a 
specific distracter, and the rebound effect was observed. However, Ju and Lien (2016) 
found that participants had more thoughts about a video of white bears during suppres­
sion than during a subsequent monitor-only phase whether they used focused breathing 
or focused on thoughts of a blue car (although earlier those who engaged in focused 
breathing had fewer instances of mind wandering). Clark, Winton, and Thynn (1993) did 
not find any differences in nonclinical groups instructed not to rely on a specific dis­
tracter to suppress thoughts about a story of a green rabbit and those given general sup­
pression instructions. The latter finding could suggest that, left to their own devices, par­
ticipants may naturally use a variety of distracters. In their within-subjects comparison, 
Najmi et al. (2009) found no rebound effect of suppression on obsessional thoughts in 
people with OCD whether they were instructed to suppress using focused distraction or 
given no instruction.
Meanwhile, Salkovskis and Campbell (1994) found that suppression with distraction was 
associated with less discomfort with and greater acceptability of the obsessional thought 
than suppression with no instructions. Finally, Salkovskis and Reynolds (1994), Salkovskis 
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and Campbell (1994), and Lin and Wicker (2007) all found that when participants were 
given an attentionally engaging task while suppressing personally relevant thoughts they 
had fewer target thought occurrences than did participants who were only instructed to 
suppress. This would appear to contradict the idea that cognitive load necessarily com­
promises capacity to suppress unwanted thoughts.
Revisiting the Wegner Model
There is no doubt that our attempts to suppress unwanted thoughts can fail—and some­
times quite miserably. However, the ironic effect of suppression has not been consistently 
observed, which in part may be due to the limitations of our paradigms for studying it but 
may also suggest that the model for understanding the impact of suppression may be un­
derspecified.
Cognitive Load
Wegner (2009) stated that we are successful at suppression far more often than not, the 
mediator being cognitive load. However, our capacity to function adaptively relies on our 
ability to inhibit thoughts that are not relevant to current goals, and, especially, thoughts 
that might be actively detrimental to those goals (e.g., Anderson & Green, 2001). We are 
therefore able to inhibit thoughts that compromise both internal (e.g., mood regulation) 
and external (e.g., work, interpersonal, family) goals most of the time, even though we 
live in a complex world in which demands on working memory are the norm rather than 
the exception. In thought suppression studies, cognitive load is typically introduced via a 
simultaneous working memory task, a competing attentional task, or time pressure, and 
this work consistently found that people had more difficulty suppressing. However, sever­
al studies found that when participants suppressed personally relevant negative thoughts 
by engaging in an attentionally demanding task they were very effective at suppression. 
Wang, Hagger, and Chatzisarantis (2017) presented evidence that concentrating on a 
“need supportive” event was associated with lower accessibility of a target thought than 
other forms of focused distraction. This may demonstrate that engaging in an attentional­
ly demanding task does not reliably hinder suppression (i.e., we are able to do both), par­
ticularly with practice. It could also mean that we are able to effectively switch our atten­
tion away from the task of suppression and on to the pursuit of more important goals (i.e., 
move from avoidance to approach motivation), or that when we are engaged in meaning­
ful activity we have the capacity to stay focused.
Thought Suppression Goals and Strategies
The discussion above leads to the question of what the goal of suppression actually is. 
When people suppress, what are they actually attempting to accomplish? Is it to think of 
something else or to avoid thinking of something? Goals may be distal (feel better, per­
form better) that are realized by the accomplishment of proximal goals (get rid of disturb­
ing thought, bring to mind a pleasant thought). Although Wegner’s model asserts that the 
controlled distracter search is unfocused and will stop at the first available distracter, we 
actually know relatively little about how people suppress their thoughts when left to their 
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own devices; it is possible they are, in fact, quite strategic and know what works best for 
them.
It is also important to note that whether the suppression goal is framed in approach or 
avoidance terms could be relatively important; whereas approach goals are associated 
with behavioral activation, avoidance goals are associated with behavioral inhibition 
(Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Different factors may influence each. For example, execu­
tive functioning deficits may compromise people’s capacity to get rid of a thought but 
may not influence people’s capacity to call another thought to mind. Brewin and Beaton 
(2002) and Brewin and Smart (2005) found that lower working memory capacity was as­
sociated with greater difficulty suppressing thoughts (although the actual strategies par­
ticipants used was not examined).
Bomyea and Amir (2011) randomly assigned participants to either undergo training to im­
prove working memory capacity or not, had them identify a painful memory, and then un­
dergo a suppression task in which they marked occurrences of thoughts about the painful 
memory using a counter. In the task were three intervals: monitor thoughts, suppress 
thoughts about the unwanted memory, and then monitor thoughts again. They found that 
participants who had been trained to improve WMC had significantly fewer thoughts dur­
ing suppression than did those who did not receive the training. Furthermore, those who 
received the training showed a decrease in thoughts from the first monitoring interval to 
the suppression interval, whereas those without the training did not. Thought frequency 
did not increase in the third interval for either group. Thus, successful suppression may 
well reflect working memory capacity. Meanwhile, there is evidence that different sup­
pression strategies are associated with different areas of the brain. For example, Benoit 
and Anderson (2012) found that whereas direct suppression of a memory and its manifes­
tation in thoughts is associated with down-regulation of the hippocampus, thought substi­
tution is associated with activation of the left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex.
Thought suppression itself has been identified as a maladaptive form of experiential 
avoidance (Hayes, Strohsal, & Wilson, 1999) and as a maladaptive emotion regulation 
strategy (e.g., Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). However, according to emo­
tion regulation models, reappraisal qualifies as a healthy, adaptive way of regulating emo­
tion. Participants who are not given instructions as to how to suppress their thoughts may 
well use reappraisal or acceptance. In fact, Siep et al. (2012) found that suppression was 
associated with a greater decrease in mesocorticolimbic activity than was cognitive reap­
praisal. Other strategies, such as focused distraction, could readily be used as a means of 
experiential avoidance, which although successful in the short term may bespeak poor 
functioning. On the other hand, focused distraction is a fundamental component of cer­
tain forms of mindfulness meditation. Thus, when we do not know the motivation, goals, 
and strategies behind suppression our understanding of its role in the persistence of un­
wanted thoughts will be quite limited.
Alternative Ways of Studying Thought Suppression
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The previous discussion indicates that the current paradigms for studying suppression 
have limitations that may cloud our understanding of the persistence of unwanted 
thoughts. There may be merit in adapting paradigms that study memory suppression and 
attentional bias to bear on understanding thought suppression.
Think/No Think Paradigm
Anderson and colleagues developed a Think/No-Think (TNT) paradigm that assesses ca­
pacity to suppress memory. In the TNT paradigm, participants first learn word pairs, after 
which they are then presented with one word from each pair in succession. On Think tri­
als they are to retrieve the word that goes with the word presented and to think about it; 
whereas on No Think trials they are not to think of the word that goes with the word pre­
sented. Memory for the word pairs is subsequently assessed. Using this paradigm, Ander­
son and colleagues have systematically demonstrated that people are able to suppress 
thoughts that interfere with goal-directed activity, exhibiting significantly poorer recall 
for words on No Think trials, even when given a financial incentive for recalling them ac­
curately (e.g., Anderson & Levy, 2009). The TNT paradigm is an interesting way of study­
ing suppression of memory, and, by extension, suppression of unwanted thoughts. Any vi­
sual stimuli can be used (faces, words) and can be varied in terms of emotional valence 
and personal relevance. The suppression instructions in the No Think trials can be modi­
fied to so as to instruct direct suppression (“suppress any effort to retrieve anything at all 
in response to the cue and to push it away”) or thought substitution (“generate substitute 
memories or thoughts to distract yourself”), thereby controlling for whatever sponta­
neous strategies participants might use.
The TNT paradigm gets around many of the methodological issues of research reviewed 
here, including priming effects (as the to be suppressed material is not mentioned by 
name), problems inherent in identifying thought occurrences, as well as carry-over ef­
fects from serial thought monitoring intervals. However, Anderson and colleagues have 
encountered the same issue of central importance to the thought suppression reviewed in 
this article, which is motivation; if people are not motivated to suppress, the suppression 
of retrieval effect is unlikely to be demonstrated. For example, Hertel and Gerstle (2003) 
found that participants who reported high rumination had better recall of negatively va­
lenced words they had been instructed to suppress than did those low in rumination. Faw­
cett et al. (2015) observed that this could be a result of inhibition deficits in people who 
ruminate, or it could reflect the fact that people who ruminate believe that rumination is 
useful and are less motivated to suppress it. They found that ruminators reported less ef­
fort at suppressing on No Think trials and that this accounted for some (but not all) of the 
lack of suppression-induced forgetting. This once again highlights the fact that we cannot 
understand the impact of suppression attempts or their meaning unless we know some­
thing about the appraisal of the thought’s meaning and significance, motivation, and 
goals.
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Attentional Deployment
If we consider that an unwanted thought is an internal threat stimulus then we can draw 
upon research on attentional bias to threat as a paradigm for understanding the impact of 
suppression. Since where people look is an excellent indicator of what they are thinking 
about, thought suppression may be profitably studied by examining deployment of visual 
attention to thought relevant cues or images. Motivation to look at versus not to look at 
thought-relevant stimuli can be assessed and its influence on attentional deployment ex­
amined. For example, Nelson et al. (2015) had people passively view threat versus neu­
tral images while their eye movements were tracked under anxious and calm mood induc­
tions. At the end of the study participants were shown a random subset of 10 of the threat 
images and asked to report how motivated they were to attend to the image and how mo­
tivated they were to avoid attending to it. Following anxious induction, all participants ex­
hibited an overall pattern of initial engagement with threat followed by disengagement 
across time. However, motivation to attend to threat and motivation to avoid attending to 
threat were correlated –.37, indicating considerable ambivalence about where to deploy 
attention.
Participants were then grouped according to their motivation ratings as avoiders (low in 
motivation to look, high in motivation to avoid looking), engagers (high motivation to 
look, low motivation to avoid looking), indifferent (low motivation on both indices), and 
ambivalent (high motivation to look and avoid looking). Following the anxious mood in­
duction, the engagers showed a clear and consistent bias toward looking at threat, 
whereas the avoiders showed an equally clear and consistent bias away from threat. 
Thus, people motivated to avoid looking at threat were successful in doing so, whereas 
those who showed a bias toward threat were also motivated to do so; that is, they did not 
have difficulty disengaging, they simply were not motivated to disengage in the first 
place. In future work, this paradigm could be used to study visual deployment to images 
under “look” and “don’t look” instructions, and, as in the TNT paradigm priming effects 
can be avoided as the to-be-suppressed target does not have to be named; instead partici­
pants can be instructed to look away from “the image that has the yellow border,” for ex­
ample.
Conclusion
In conclusion, research on the impact of thought suppression on the frequency of unwant­
ed thoughts has yielded highly inconsistent findings, which range from evidence of strong 
rebound or immediate enhancement effects to null effects to evidence that suppression is 
effective in reducing thought occurrences. However, the task of designing a paradigm in 
which to study the impact of suppression on the recurrence of thoughts in an ecologically 
valid way that controls for artifact is challenging. Indeed, even identifying and assessing 
the key dependent variable (thought occurrences, thought perseverance, mental preoccu­
pation) is difficult. There may be merit in conceptualizing unwanted thoughts as internal 
threat stimuli, bringing threat theories to bear on our understanding of their persistence, 
and examining overt indices of attentional preoccupation, such as eye gaze. In sum, we 
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may want to shift from understanding the persistence of unwanted thoughts as the prod­
uct of failed suppression efforts and instead consider suppression to be a product of tar­
get thought appraisal, whose success may depend heavily on the goal of suppression in 
the moment and the means used to achieve that goal.
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